From Nationalism to Factionalism: Faultlines in the Naga Insurgency

Do ceasefires or peace talks create fragmentation in the insurgent groups? Rather than proposing claims that can offer predictions about armed groups behaviour under ceasefires or peace processes, the analysts tend to focus largely on the dynamics between state and non-state actor. The experts pay little attention to overtime changes in social and local political context which might contribute to propelling a rebel group towards fragmentation and factionalism. The present study intends to fill this gap by exploring the shifting role of public opinion and ethnic support for the peace talks to ascertain whether it can increase the likelihood of factionalism in rebel groups or not. This article applies this approach to the case of Naga National Movement (1947–2015) in India, and finds that the proposed variable appears to have increased the frequency of factionalism in the movement.     

Explaining Cohesion in an Insurgent Organization: The Case of the Mizo National Front

Despite the prevalence of violent uprisings against the states, existing literature has produced a generalized explanation of the causes and onset of such uprisings ignoring crucial aspects of (non-state) armed group cohesion, such as their capabilities to manage intra-group tensions and rivalries. In this paper, I examine recent research in the field of civil conflict to understand the importance of investigating underlying constraints which can cause serious impediments to the capabilities of a state during the course of a war. The paper then focuses on the importance of internal strategic resources, such as pre-war and wartime sociopolitical networks in which insurgents mobilize, recruit new cadres and maintain intra-group cooperation, to suggest how it can contain the consequences of counterinsurgency operations and other state strategies on the internal cohesion of an insurgent group. A detailed case study of the Mizo National Front (MNF) in India demonstrates the argument’s plausibility.     

Insurgency and Violent Extremism in Pakistan

Pakistan has an uneven history of dealing with insurgencies and extremism. This article identifies the various campaigns and policies employed to defeat militants and deal with violent extremism. It describes the major anti-state groups and how Pakistan’s military and civilian leaders, relying on the related strategies of selectivity, gradualism and containment, have allowed militancy and terrorism to thrive. This article finds that while the elites and the public may have belatedly come to appreciate the existential internal threats these groups pose to the country, there are strong reasons to doubt the state’s full commitment to its promises to take meaningful action.     

Japan’s Emerging Trajectory as a ‘Cyber Power’: From Securitization to Militarization of Cyberspace

Japan has been overlooked as a ‘cyber power’ but it now becoming a serious player in this new strategic domain. Japanese policy-makers have forged a consensus to move cybersecurity to the very core of national security policy, to create more centralized frameworks for cybersecurity, and for Japan’s military institutions to build dynamic cyberdefense capabilities. Japan’s stance has moved rapidly toward the securitization and now militarization of responses to cyber challenges. Japan’s cybersecurity stance has bolstered US–Japan alliance responses to securing all dimensions of the ‘global commons’ and extended its defense perimeter to further deter but potentially raise tensions with China.     

美国网络安全战略管理体系分析

文章从美国政府颁布的政策文件、法律法规和各机构部门的职能三个方面,对美国网络安全战略管理体系进行了介绍和分析。     

公安现役部队遂行非战争军事行动训练的发展趋势探析

遂行非战争军事行动训练是公安现役部队教育训练的重要内容。近年来其训练效果在公安现役部队履职实践中得到了良好的体现。但面对日益复杂的斗争形势,公安现役部队在进行常规训练的同时,应更加突出应急训练、联合训练和心理训练,以更好地完成党和人民赋予的神圣使命。     

国家安全中枢的构筑——对十八届三中全会决定“设立国家安全委员会”的解读

国家安全委员会具有“内外兼备”的基本职能,即：将维护国家安全与创新社会治理、创新有效预防和化解社会矛盾体制、健全公共安全体系等内政事务并列并举,在维护国内安全稳定方面也肩负重任。它较之现今的“国安领导小组”更为广泛和重要,是一个应对有别于国家日常工作之外的应急的危机管理机构,是应对可能的、突发的、潜在的对国家安全、利益构成威胁的前瞻性机构。     

The prospects of combined action: Lessons from Vietnam

Military commanders, policymakers, and analysts have recently embraced the concept of combined action as a powerful tool to improve the effectiveness of Afghan security forces in the fight against the Taliban. In doing so, they explicitly draw inspiration from the Combined Action Program employed by US Marines during the Vietnam War. This program is widely considered to have greatly improved the effectiveness of South Vietnamese government forces and contributed to increased population security in its area of operations and is considered a model worthy of emulation. This study finds that the success of the Vietnam-era Combined Action Program was more qualified than contemporary proponents argue. It argues that successes were tempered, and conditioned, by the choice of junior commanders, the level of operational control enjoyed by the US Marines, and the way the local forces were recruited and deployed. These conditions offer valuable lessons for those seeking to employ combined action not only in present-day Afghanistan, but also in future counterinsurgency campaigns.     

The African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis: conceptual breakthrough or anti-imperialist phantom?

The creation of an African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis (ACIRC) is a sign of Africa's willingness to take its destiny into its own hands. Presented as a reaction to the slowness of the development of the African Standby Force (ASF), it is also a response to some of the ASF's conceptual weaknesses. This decision reflects a wish to establish an instrument better equipped to deal with the challenges Africa is facing. Departing from the (sub)regional logic of the ASF results from a desire to take into account the transnational nature of threats, while its enlarged mandate is meant to offer Africa the capacity to intervene in all kinds of conflicts, including by undertaking peace enforcement activities. But the obstacles on the road towards the actual creation and mobilisation of this capacity should not be underestimated. These include material difficulties, but also political tensions, between ‘small’ and ‘big’ states as well as between the African Union and subregional organisations. The risk then is high that the ACIRC, whose announcement came as a reaction to France's intervention in Mali, ends up joining the ranks of the many ‘anti-imperialist’ phantoms haunting the history of the Organization of African Unity/African Union (OAU/AU). Confronted by events considered ‘neocolonial’ initiatives, African actors have indeed traditionally reacted by launching grand projects that never got off the ground. However, by actually establishing this new instrument, they may also demonstrate that times have definitively changed.     

The African Peace and Security Architecture and its partners

This article presents survey data on the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). It focuses explicitly on two aspects: the internal constitution and achievements of the APSA; and coordination and cooperation with external actors, such as Regional Economic Communities, the United Nations and the European Union. The survey, conducted between October 2011 and December 2012, targeted 198 security experts in international organisations, think tanks, academia and non-governmental organisations. It reveals the APSA's current stage of development, achievements and challenges.